Some say this is the most serious oil crisis since the 1970s.

In Thailand and Vietnam, gas stations have run out of fuel, forcing people to work from home; South Korean chip factories are starting to worry about helium supply; Japan has already begun discussing buying oil from Alaska; food aid agencies in Africa are worried about where to find food if the war continues for another three months.

All these things are happening simultaneously this week, and the impact of the war on this world is more chaotic than we imagined.

Since the Middle East war began, the Hormuz Strait has effectively been blocked, leaving nearly 20% of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas supply hanging in the balance. Oil prices have soared by 40% from pre-war levels, surpassing $110 per barrel, and Iran has publicly stated that their goal is to push this number to 200. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facility has been bombed, a supply node that accounts for 20% of global natural gas trade, and restoring capacity could take several years.

So, when will this war end and how will it end? BlockBeats has compiled five of the most likely scenarios.

Around April, Swift Resolution

The most ideal scenario is that the war will end in a short period of time.

Some analysts believe this is the scenario President Trump most desires and the ending he has been strategizing for all along. After all, Trump's mindset has never been like a general but more like a CEO who moves on to the next deal once one is done. He has even said himself: the United States has won almost every battle in its history but lost too many wars, not because they couldn't win, but because they didn't know how to exit after winning. Vietnam was like this, Iraq was like this, Afghanistan was like this. He doesn't want to repeat the cycle.

Therefore, in the military operation codenamed "Epic Fury," the U.S. military prioritized targeted "decapitation strikes" against the top echelon of the Iranian regime and "de-militarization" strikes against nuclear capabilities, missile facilities, and naval forces. Once these "teeth that threaten the security of the United States and its allies" are completely removed, Trump plans to transition the military operation to the final phase.

According to the path of this scenario, the ceasefire point is expected around April, with several corresponding time points here.

The first time point is the China visit. Trump's original plan to visit China was at the end of March or early April, but it is now delayed to late April or early May. Trump does not want to be distracted by an unresolved "Middle East situation" when visiting Beijing; he needs to appear as a victor to have a stronger position in the U.S.-China trade negotiations. Treasury Secretary Benson has also confirmed that the delay is purely due to the need to command the war effort, as the trade negotiations in Paris are progressing smoothly. This means the diplomatic path is clear, waiting only for the military side to wrap up.

The second timeframe is the midterm elections. As the November midterm elections approach, Trump needs a stable economic environment, especially with stable oil prices and expectations of a Fed rate cut. If the inflationary impact of the war continues for more than six weeks, it will permeate the entire supply chain and reflect in summer corporate earnings reports, by which time the Republican Party will be in a difficult position. Lower oil prices from their peak to facilitate a Fed rate cut around September under the guise of a "jobs emergency" to secure victory in the midterm elections.

Iran's Bid, Buying a Way Out with Oil Commission

Currently, the US-Iran negotiation situation presents a strange "locked-room mystery": Trump claims progress is smooth, but Iran's Speaker of Parliament Kalibaf and official media vehemently deny any contact.

Trump recently revealed that the current interlocutors are a "completely different set of people" who brought a gift involving oil and gas. There are rumors that they are offering to pay the US a 5% commission of Iran's oil sales directly. If this number is accurate, considering Iran's export scale, it is a significant amount.

Who are these "completely different people"? They are likely Iran's regular army (Artesh), not the well-known, supreme leader loyal Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). There is an inherent conflict between these two forces; Artesh is the national army, while the IRGC is an ideological tool. When the pressure to survive reaches a certain level, moderates in the regular army may choose to bypass the supreme leader, secretly engage with the US, which is not unprecedented or impossible.

However, from Iran's perspective, their adamant "denial of negotiations" also has a certain political stance.

Iran is well aware of Trump's emphasis on stock market performance. Just after the US announced a pause in strikes, global oil prices and US stocks quickly stabilized. By denying negotiations, Iran aims to dilute Trump's economic "windfall" to prevent the US from gaining more leverage at the negotiation table. Secondly, it is to maintain the legitimacy of their rule. For the theocratic regime reliant on a tough-guy image to maintain control, openly reconciling with the "Great Satan" is akin to political suicide.

Some veteran military analysts point out that while Trump threatened to bomb Iran's power plants, he recently temporarily eased oil export sanctions on Russia and Iran. This is not a sign of weakness but a manifestation of Trump's "America First" logic. He needs Iran's oil to continue flowing into the market to stabilize inflation, but he will not allow Tehran to control the strait. This "holding a big stick in one hand while giving a green light in the other" approach fundamentally uses Iran's energy infrastructure as a dynamic leverage, testing the other party's bottom line during a 5-day grace period.

However, this script has its risks. Strategist Hansen provides a rather sober assessment: this compromise is at best a "pause button for war"; Iran's ideological foundation remains unshaken, and the next Revolutionary Guard, the next proxy militia, will inevitably emerge. A more practical obstacle comes from Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince MBS's stance is very direct: there can be no turning back. To Saudi Arabia, stopping halfway, leaving behind a resentful yet still-breathing Iran, is more dangerous than not engaging at all. Saudi Arabia is pressuring Trump to use this historic window to completely eradicate the hardline regime.

In addition, some analysts point out that Prince Pahlavi, the heir to the Pahlavi dynasty who has been in exile in the United States for nearly half a century, is gradually becoming the "lowest common denominator" of the internal opposition forces in Iran. Perhaps for the United States, blocking the Strait of Hormuz is just a tactical game, and supporting Pahlavi (or a coalition government centered around him) to take over Iran is the true "flag of the general" that can fundamentally eliminate the Middle East's energy threat and reshape the geopolitical landscape.

Seizing Islands, Controlling the Strait, Continuously Attacking Iran

If the negotiations collapse, or if Trump decides to escalate militarily while continuing negotiations, then the focus of the battlefield will shift to several small islands around the Strait of Hormuz.

The names of Qeshm Island, Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands, and Abu Musa Island are not often mentioned in normal circumstances, but they control about one-fifth of the global oil trade's vital waterway. Whoever takes control of these islands holds the "master switch" of the Middle East's energy landscape.

The U.S. military's strategic intent here is quite clear: bypass the quagmire of Iran's interior and directly control the "valve" of the strait. This is a typical "maritime-centric" approach, not seeking to occupy but to control the chokepoint. The Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands and Abu Musa Island have an additional value: they are disputed territories between the UAE and Iran, and after the U.S. military seizes them, they are directly handed over to the UAE, establishing both a long-term ally defense circle and delivering a significant political gift to the Gulf countries.

Some military analysts point out that the signs of further U.S. troop deployments are quite obvious. Recently, 17 C-17 transport planes have flown intensively to the Middle East, with 6 of them coming from Bragg Base, the home of the 82nd Airborne Division and Delta Force. The core ability of the 82nd Airborne Division is speed, able to deploy globally within 18 hours, and the advance forces are already in place. Marines from Okinawa and California are rushing over to handle the long-term control of large islands, which will take another three to four weeks to be in position.

The so-called "five-day window" is actually to wait for the heavy expeditionary force to arrive at the designated location and to provide the final terrain reconnaissance period for the special operations units.

And the most sensitive variable is Halk Island. This island carries 90% of Iran's oil exports, with extremely high strategic value. However, the island is covered with large oil storage tanks. Once a major fire breaks out, global oil prices will immediately spiral out of control. This is a result that the United States itself cannot afford.

An analysis report from the Hudson Institute pointed out that in the first ten days of the war, the U.S. military struck more than 5000 targets. This high-intensity "de-militarization" pace is essentially conducting a 21st-century "industrial capability deprivation war."

Therefore, this perspective believes that if a quick conclusion is not possible and pressure continues to be applied, then further military action is more likely to involve precise control using special forces rather than all-out warfare. Because the goal of the war is not necessarily to overthrow the Iranian regime but to achieve "tactical weakening." This is similar to the Allied forces' attacks on Germany's industrial capacity in the later stages of World War II. The aim is to dismantle Iran's regional power projection capabilities accumulated over the past few decades, including nuclear facilities, ballistic missile production sites, and naval forces.

Ultimately, Iran may be weakened to resemble a "large Hamas," meaning that while the regime remains intact, its substantial threat capabilities to the world may be lost over the next 10 to 20 years.

Jiang Xueqin's Prediction: The U.S. Will Lose

Recently, the name Jiang Xueqin has become popular because a video of him lecturing on international affairs in a Beijing high school classroom two years ago has been widely circulated. The lecturer in the video is Jiang Xueqin. At that time, based on history and geopolitical logic, he predicted that Trump might be re-elected and the U.S. might take action against Iran. As some of his predictions have been confirmed by reality, his YouTube subscribers have rapidly increased, and many netizens have called him "China's Nostradamus." Complete interview translation: "Jiang Xueqin's Latest Interview Full Text: How to View the Current Global Changes")

His core argument regarding this Middle East war is: The U.S. may win every tactical battle, but at a strategic level, it is losing this war.

Why?

First, the U.S. military is too cumbersome, while Iran is very agile. Iran has been preparing for this day for over twenty years. It is well aware of the U.S. military's operational logic and has deliberately designed countermeasures for every scenario. The two aircraft carriers, the USS Gerald R. Ford and the USS Abraham Lincoln, are indeed present, but due to Iran's possession of hypersonic weapons and a large number of suicide drones, the aircraft carriers dare not approach Iran's coastline. The massive steel fortresses have turned into distant decorations. Through multiple U.S. military war simulations, it has been shown many times that the U.S. would lose, not because of insufficient firepower, but because this system is incapable of dealing with this type of adversary.

Secondly, once on land, it's a bottomless pit. Jiang Xueqin views the plan to seize Hark Island as a classic sunk-cost trap. The island may be captured, but it's too close to Iran's mainland to hold. To defend the island, one must control the coastline; to control the coastline, one must advance deep into the Zagros Mountains. The mission will endlessly expand like a snowball rolling downhill, following the path of the Vietnam War. No one intends to go down this road, but once embarked, it's challenging to turn back.

Thirdly, the Shi'ite theological framework is the Western world's most underestimated variable. In the Shi'ite narrative, compromising with an unjust enemy is the true failure, even if it means resisting unto death. The U.S.'s choice to assassinate Ayatollah Khamenei and his family precisely touches upon the deepest trauma of "betrayal" in Shi'ite history. This won't make Iran yield; instead, it will inflame the resistance will of the entire Shi'ite world, intensifying their resolve.

More challenging is that the U.S. now has no real exit ramp. If troops are withdrawn, Iran will present an astronomical bill, around $10 trillion in reparations, along with demanding the permanent departure of the U.S. from the Middle East. In that case, Gulf nations would collectively lean towards Iran, the petrodollar system would tremble, and the confidence of Japan, South Korea, and Europe in U.S. protection capabilities would collapse. If the U.S. continues to fight, its $39 trillion debt and the economic structure relying on foreign purchase of dollars cannot sustain a prolonged war of attrition.

Advance, and it's a quagmire. Retreat, and it's defeat.

The subsequent scenario depicted by Jiang Xueqin is grim: the war evolves into a long-term attrition similar to Ukraine, with Saudi Arabia declaring war on Iran and inadvertently dragging Pakistan in, Iran driving oil prices to $200 per barrel, Qatar's LNG facilities severely damaged causing a long-term 20% global natural gas trade outage, and an energy crisis erupting in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Looking further ahead, three structural trends concurrently resurface: deindustrialization due to the end of cheap energy, remilitarization due to the dissolution of the "Pax Americana," and a return to mercantilism due to globalization fragmentation.

On U.S. soil, if Trump pushes for nationwide conscription, the politically divided nation would witness the National Guard deployed in cities, leading America towards a prolonged state of unrest akin to Northern Ireland's "Troubles" era—not a civil war but far from peaceful.

This script has no winners, only varying degrees of losers.

Apocalypse Now, They Await the Messiah

Finally, this last script, many rationalists are unwilling to take it seriously because it sounds too much like science fiction. However, ignoring it is the truly unserious attitude.

Within Israel, there exists an end-times fervor. Some rabbis and believers no longer view this war through the lens of security or geopolitics; instead, they see it as a catalyst for the "Messiah's arrival." In this framework, the greater the pressure Israel endures, the closer the divine intervention.

The most thrilling part of this doomsday script is the operation targeting the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem. The script predicts that Israel may take advantage of the extreme chaos of war, using the long-standing "archaeological excavation" cover-up to carry out a precise "controlled demolition," thus completely destroying this mosque. This destruction is meant to clear the way for the construction of the Jewish "Third Temple."

Because, according to religious beliefs, the rebuilding of the temple signifies the complete revival of the Jewish nation and the dawn of the Messianic era. To deflect international pressure and religious outrage, this action may be cleverly blamed on a misfire of an Iranian missile or a stray warhead, triggering an unprecedented full-scale religious showdown between Persians, Arabs, and Israelis.

The "Greater Israel Plan" emerges, based on ancient religious narratives, aiming to expand the territory to a vast region stretching from the Nile River in Egypt to the Euphrates River in Iraq, even reaching parts of southern Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

By completely destabilizing the existing geopolitical landscape, compelling all Jews scattered abroad to return to the land, a new world order dominated by theocracy would be established.

The supporters of this scenario include the approximately 7 million members of the "Christian Support for Israel" organization in the United States and a large evangelical community, who are significant financial and moral pillars of such agendas, sincerely believing that Israel is a key fulcrum for the Second Coming of Jesus. On a more secretive level, Freemasons, Knights Templar, Rosicrucians, and several specific sects within Judaism are believed to be involved behind the scenes in shaping the direction of policies in some way.

There are two possible interpretations of Trump's role in this script: he may have been misled by advisors like Kushner and Rubio, who have apocalyptic tendencies, and become an unwitting actor; or, after facing impeachment, prosecution, assassination attempts, and miraculously returning to the White House, he himself may have developed a kind of "Chosen People" messianic delusion.

The intervention of this mystical variable turns this Middle East war not into a conflict that can be easily resolved through diplomatic negotiations but into a self-reinforcing system that, once activated, could drag the whole world into an abyss of reshaping civilization and foundational beliefs.

Al Jazeera recently published an article titled "The US-Israel Strategy to Strike Iran is Working," written by a US State Department advisor who believes that this US military action is systematically dismantling Iran's ability to project regional power. Critics focus only on the current casualties and economic costs, failing to see that the threats accumulated over the past 40 years are being eliminated one by one.

Interestingly, Al Jazeera, which is often seen as having a pro-Arab, pro-Islamic stance, publishing this article itself indicates one thing: a significant portion of the Middle East already believes that the US will emerge victorious this time.

How will it end? Five scripts, five endings, perhaps each coming true on its own, perhaps overlapping,

Trump wants a quick ending, but the war may not fit his schedule; Iran wants to buy a way out, but Saudi Arabia won't allow this war to end so easily; the U.S. military wants to control the strait, but the cost of an island battle has yet to be tallied; Jiang Xueqin says America will lose, but defeat itself has a hundred forms; the doomsday believers are waiting for the Messiah, but history has never followed the script of religion.

The ship is sailing, the engines roaring, the deck filled with people, each pushing it forcefully in the direction they believe is right.

But no one is at the helm.