On the morning of April 22, Trump said during a phone interview on CNBC's Squawk Box: "I don't want to extend the ceasefire. We don't have much time left. I expect to start bombing because I think it's a better posture to take."

Several hours after making this statement, he posted on Truth Social announcing an indefinite extension of the ceasefire until Iran submits a proposal and negotiations conclude in some fashion.

Trump's "step" this time was the Chief of Army Staff and Prime Minister of Pakistan stepping in to request the ceasefire. He also mentioned that this decision was related to the "severe division within the Iranian government."

For those familiar with Trump, they know this is his typical TACO move.

How the Ceasefire Was Extended This Time

It appears this was not a proactive diplomatic victory but a passive decision made without better options before the deadline.

This story begins with the Islamabad negotiations on April 11.

At that time, Vice President Vance led a U.S. delegation to fly to Pakistan, engaging in a 21-hour dialogue with Iran. This was the highest-level direct talk between the U.S. and Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. When Vance left, he declared that Iran "refused to accept U.S. conditions." The core U.S. demand was a clear commitment from Iran not to seek nuclear weapons—not only a commitment not to build nuclear bombs but also to commit to relinquish any technological capacity for rapid nuclearization. Iran did not agree to this demand. Iran's chief negotiator and Speaker of Parliament, Kalibaf, stated that the U.S. must decide first "whether they can earn our trust."

Following the breakdown of negotiations, the United States promptly announced a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

A two-week ceasefire framework was established on April 8, with the expiration date set for April 22. On the eve of the expiration, the situation deteriorated rapidly: Iran had not confirmed whether they would attend the second round of talks, with Pakistan's Minister of Information publicly stating, "Formal reply not received to date." In response, Pakistan proactively enhanced security deployment in Islamabad, and security personnel were seen around the Serena Hotel in Islamabad – a detail indicating that Pakistan was still awaiting Iran's confirmation to attend.

Vance was scheduled to fly to Islamabad again, but after a series of internal meetings at the White House, the trip was indefinitely postponed. Reports from The Wall Street Journal even suggested that Trump, in private discussions, had considered canceling the trip altogether due to Iran's unwillingness to compromise on the nuclear enrichment issue. The Iranian negotiation team subsequently informed the U.S. through Pakistani intermediaries that, in this scenario, participating in the talks would be a waste of time as the U.S. was preventing any substantive agreement from being reached.

Meanwhile, Trump was also facing significant pressure from within the U.S. political landscape.

Deutsche Bank had constructed a "pressure index" that combined inflation expectations and U.S. Treasury bond yields to predict the White House's policy adjustment points. According to this framework, when the price of crude oil approaches $95–100 per barrel, the White House's stance would noticeably soften; and when the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield nears 4.5%, the actual pressure for policy adjustment would truly emerge.

Currently, WTI has already surpassed $90. If the situation escalates again after the ceasefire expires, it is not difficult to imagine oil prices exceeding $100. Gasoline prices at the pump exceeding $4 per gallon have historically had a strong impact on U.S. leaders' approval ratings.

In addition, Trump plans to visit China in mid-May, hoping to appear as a "victor" rather than a "wartime president." This timeframe has given Iran more leverage in the game and has provided Washington with greater flexibility on the deadline issue.

The term "indefinite extension," viewed from this perspective, seems more like a domestic political posture than a diplomatic concession to Iran. It gives Trump the space to delay without declaring failure.

In this state, Trump announced the extension.

Axios' analysis hit the nail on the head: While this extension avoided a resumption of war and large-scale regional escalation, it weakened Trump's own bargaining chips. A credible threat of force relies precisely on the authenticity of the countdown. Every TACO erodes the credibility of the next threat.

Internal Division in Iran

The Iranian response is divided, with apparent tension between moderates and hardliners.

The tone on Iranian state television is one of victory narrative: Iran is the "battlefield victor," and controlling the Strait of Hormuz is the most valuable chip in this battle. Iran agrees to a military ceasefire, but "the war is not over yet." At the same time, Iranian state television warns that the precondition for negotiations is not to discuss any topics that "violate Iran's independence and dignity," including defense and missile capabilities, nuclear capacity, and technology.

The hardliners' rhetoric is more direct. An advisor to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament stated, "Trump's ceasefire extension is meaningless, as the losing side cannot dictate terms," and warned that this extension is a "ploy to buy time for a strike."

However, Iran also has moderate voices. Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations, Eslami, stated that the government has received "some signals" from the U.S. about lifting the blockade, and once the blockade is lifted, the "next round of negotiations will be held in Islamabad." He emphasized that the U.S. naval blockade itself violates the ceasefire agreement, and lifting the blockade is a precondition for holding new negotiations. When asked about his confidence in the prospects for negotiations, his response was, "We should give it a chance; we are hopeful."

The core contradiction remains unchanged: the U.S. demands complete denuclearization, while Iran insists on lifting the blockade first. Both sides are using delays to maneuver.

What's Next for BTC?

It is evident that in the past two weeks, Bitcoin's price has been largely driven by the Middle East geopolitical narrative rather than the macro environment.

Last Friday, Bitcoin surged to $78,300, hitting a new high since early February. Subsequently, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, causing the price to fall to the $75,000–$76,000 range. On April 19, the U.S. seized the "TOUSKA" cargo ship, leading Bitcoin to drop below $74,000. After the news of the ceasefire extension on April 21, the price rebounded, breaking through $76,000 on the same day, driving the entire crypto market up by over 1%, with a total market cap reaching $2.55 trillion.

At every price point, there corresponds a specific event on the battlefield.

On an institutional level, the demand has not disappeared. Bitcoin spot ETFs saw a net inflow of approximately $1.29 billion during April 14 to 17, and the figures were even higher in the week around April 10, reaching about $1.1 billion, aligning closely with the ceasefire expectations around Islamabad negotiations.

Rachel Lucas, an analyst at BTC Markets, concludes, "Bitcoin's current resilience is more a result of market mechanics than narrative. Institutional buyers, especially corporate funds, are aggressively buying the dips on each pullback." The analyst also pointed out that this rally coincided with the market's attention on Federal Reserve Chair nominee Powell's hearing, with investors simultaneously betting on monetary policy direction.

But the data signal from the internal structure tells a different story.

Despite Bitcoin's return to $75,000, the perpetual contract funding rate remains in negative territory. A negative funding rate indicates that short positions still dominate the derivatives market. In other words, while the spot price is rising, the structural buying pressure has not kept pace. This rebound is driven more by short covering rather than by new long positions entering the market.

Deribit's data confirms this observation: around $1.5 billion in Bitcoin puts are concentrated around $60,000, while $1.3 billion in call options are concentrated around $75,000, creating an options structure that lacks a clear directional bias.

Thielen, Head of Research at 10x Research, shares this assessment. He points out that this rally has not been accompanied by significant buying pressure from call options. The market is essentially in a short-covering rally rather than a trend-following uptrend.

Hughes from Tokenize Capital suggests that the uptrend may weaken next month, with a risk of further downside in August.

Adding to the bearish sentiment, CryptoQuant's on-chain data model indicates that there is downward pressure on the current Bitcoin price, with a midterm possibility of testing support around $70,000. If on-chain momentum continues to weaken, a deeper pullback could reach the $56,000 range. DennyGalindo, a strategist at Morgan Stanley, suggests that Bitcoin is currently in the "autumn" phase of a four-year cycle, with winter approaching.

If the ceasefire continues and a substantial signal of openness appears in the Strait of Hormuz, some analysts believe that Bitcoin could potentially test $80,000 by the end of April. However, this scenario is based on a long chain of prerequisites: the ceasefire holding, the blockade being lifted, negotiations progressing, global energy supply expectations stabilizing, and market risk sentiment truly improving.

Almost every time, whether it's tariffs, threats to allied nations, or pressure on the Fed, the TACO moment arrives as expected, and those betting on a reversal make money.

However, the TACO moment is not a natural law but a predictive model based on past behavior. The nature of the Iran war is different from trade negotiations. It involves military casualties, sovereignty, domestic political red lines. Each cycle of the TACO exhausts the remaining trust space in negotiations and the market's operating space for the TACO. This also means that perhaps one day the TACO will completely fail.